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2. Qualitative Risk Assessment 
A standard qualitative risk assessment approach involves the evaluation of likelihood or 
probability of different accident scenarios (American Bureau of Shipping, 2000; HSE, 2002). 
Next an evaluation of the impact of the different accident scenarios with respect to the 
different consequence attributes is carried out. A risk matrix is often used in this approach. 
A risk matrix combines the likelihood of an event with its consequence severity into a risk 
level. Table 1 shows a sample qualitative assessment of the probabilities of occurrence of an 
LNG ship accident while loading/unloading at the terminal. Probabilities are assigned 
letters such as A, B, C, D and E corresponding to a linguistic scale: `frequent', `probable', 
`occasional', `remote' and `improbable' likelihoods. An indicative quantitative frequency 
range is associated with each probability level.  
 
  
Level 
 
Description 
Indicative  
Frequency 
(per vessel year) 
 
Definition 
A Frequent >0.5 Will occur frequently 
B Probable 0.05-0.5 May occur several times 
C Occasional 0.005-0.05 Likely to occur during lifetime 
D Remote  0.0005-0.005 Unlikely to occur during lifetime 
E Improbable < 0.0005 So unlikely event it may never be 
experienced 
Table 1. Definition of likelihood levels 
 
Table 2 shows a similar qualitative assessment of LNG accident consequence categories. 
Consequences are assigned numbers such as 1, 2, 3 and 4 corresponding to `minor', `major', 
'critical' and `catastrophic' severity level. An indicative descriptive linguistic range is 
associated with each consequence attribute and severity level.  
 
  
Consequence Class 
1 2 3 4 
Minor Major Critical Catastrophic 
Crew Minor 
injury 
Serious 
injury  
One fatality Several 
fatalities 
3rd Party personnel No injury Minor injury Serious injury Fatalities 
Environmental Negligible 
pollution 
Pollution 
reportable to 
regulatory 
authorities 
Minor 
release  
Pollution 
reportable to 
regulatory 
authorities 
Major release 
Pollution 
reportable to 
regulatory 
authorities  
Uncontrolled 
pollution 
Ship damage Minor 
damage 
Moderate 
damage 
Major 
damage 
Loss of ship 
Downtime Negligible One day One week More than 
one week 
Reputation Negligible Affected 
localy  
Affected 
nationaly  
Loss of 
reputation 
3rd party assets No effect Minor 
damage 
Major 
damage 
Extensive 
damage 
Table 2. Definition of severity levels of accident consequences 
 
Table 3 shows an example of the risk matrix used by ship classification societies. The risk 
matrix combines likelihood and severity into an output linguistic risk level for each scenario 
and consequence attribute. These linguistic risk values are then combined to give an overall 
linguistic risk value for each accident scenario being evaluated. Output risk level are 
denoted linguistically as `low', `medium' or `high' (Skramstad & Musaeus, 2000). 
 
  SEVERITY 
 1 2 3 4 
LIK
EL
IH
OO
D 
A M H H H 
B M M H H 
C L M M H 
D L L M M 
E L L L L 
Table 3. Example of a qualitative risk matrix 
 
3. Multiple Attribute Utility Risk Model 
A multiple attribute risk assessment approach using utility theory is presented in this 
section (Elsayed et al., 2009). Multiple attribute risk assessment based on utility theory has 
many advantages. Most importantly, it allows LNG operating companies to identify/rank 
operational risks and to express their expectations about the consequences of various 
hazardous scenarios. It also provides insights into how the uncertainty of their 
expectations affects the ranking of risk scenarios. In addition, multiple attribute risk 
assessment provides a systematic method for evaluating an organization’s risks using the 
best available hazard information. As operating companies gain better 
hazard/consequence information, the risk models can be easily updated with new input 
data and the marginal effect on risk assessment can be measured. The value of a multiple 
attribute risk assessment is not only in the numbers produced, but also in the insights that 
operating companies gain during sensitivity analyses and each refinement step of the 
assessment. 
 
3.1 Modelling Consequences Using Utility Functions 
Utility is a number measuring the attractiveness of a consequence, the higher the utility, 
the more desirable the consequence, the measurement sometimes being made on a 
probability scale (Clemen, 1997; Lindley, 1992;). Different people and/or organizations 
have different risk attitudes and thus are willing to accept different levels of risk (Oliver & 
Marshall, 1997). Some are prone to taking risks while others are more conservative and 
tend to avoid risk. Individuals who are unwilling to risk a substantial part of their assets 
even for positive expected return are said to be risk averse. Those willing to take a risky 
venture for a negative expected return are said to be risk seeking. Finally, an individual 
can be risk neutral. Risk neutrality is reflected by a utility curve that is a simple straight 
line. A decision maker that has a constant aversion to risk, is referred to as constantly risk-
averse decision maker. In this work, the constant  risk aversion utility model is adopted. 
This is to reflect the fact that LNG accident consequences are acute in nature with very 
severe consequences and LNG ship operators are constantly averse in taking accident 
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risks. An example of a utility function is the exponential utility function with constant risk 
aversion and can be  expressed as: 
 
  
1)minxmaxb(xe
1)minxb(xeu(x)


                                                     (1) 
 
Where xmax and xmin are best (most preferred) and worst (least preferred) values of the 
consequence attribute and b is a coefficient of risk aversion. In order to model the consequence 
classes shown in Fig.1, seven utility functions are needed corresponding to the seven 
consequence attributes. Each utility function is constructed such that the most preferred value 
xmax for the consequence of interest would be ‘minor’ or ‘negligible’ consequence on a 
qualitative scale and would correspond to a utility value of 1. Whereas the least preferred 
value would correspond to ‘catastrophic’, corresponding to a utility value of 0.  
 
3.2 Probabilistic Multiple Attribute Utility Risk Model 
A probabilistic multiple attribute risk model can be used for modeling situations during 
LNG ships loading/offloading at the LNG ship/terminal interface where risks needs to be 
assessed and ranked in terms of severity. Various resulting hazard consequences are taken 
into account, and a systematic and consistent evaluation of various risk alternatives is 
carried out to determine most/least severe risk alternative. These include environmental 
pollution, injuries/fatalities to crew or 3rd party personnel and material assets such as ship 
damage, down time, reputation and third party material assets.  
Multiple attribute utility theory is then used to combine the effects of different consequences 
into a unified utility measure. According to the maximum expected utility (MEU) concept 
(Chen &  Hwang, 1992), a maximum risk alternative is selected such that: 
 
       

 N
1j j
uijkMi1 minmaxR                                (2) 
 
Rmax = maximum risk alternative. 
M    = number of risk alternatives or hazards. 
N     = number of consequences. 
kij     = weight of importance of the jth consequence. 
uj  = measure of consequence, utility, of the ith consequence in terms of jth risk alternative 
 
This semi-quantitative approach assigns a numeric expected utility value for each risk 
scenario thus allowing the ranking of various hazardous scenarios. Software tools can be 
used to implement the abovementioned risk model.  
 
 
4. Fuzzy Risk Assessment 
4.1 Modelling of Probabilities and Consequences as Fuzzy Sets 
In many engineering situations there is pervasive fuzzy information, i.e. information that is 
vague/qualitative, linguistic and/or imprecise (Bellman & Zadeh, 1970; Chen & Hwang, 
1992; Zadeh, 1965; Zadeh, 1975;  Zimmerman, 1976;  Zimmerman, 1987). This is often the 
case when trying to assess accident probabilities/consequences that are not known a priori 
and/or difficult to quantify mathematically (Elsayed et al., 2008). The assignment of 
accident probabilities is usually based on reliability methods and/or historical failure data. 
Reliability methods require knowledge of the relevant physical process and the specification 
of a limit state function (Elsayed & Mansour, 2003). In many cases, historical failure data can 
be lacking and/or unreliable. When historical failure data is available, it can be 
supplemented with expert judgment (Cooke, 1996). These approaches however are not 
sufficient to predict accident probabilities under all relevant circumstances. This is due to 
lack of knowledge of physical conditions and processes, change of industry practice over the 
years, and lack/unreliability of data. Hence, predictions of accident probabilities are often 
associated with significant uncertainties. In fact it is because of these uncertainties that many 
risk assessment tools avoid absolute probability values all together and stick to relative 
probabilities (American Gas Association, 1990).  
 LNG accident consequences (Elsayed et al., 2009;  Gyles, 1992; Skramstad & Musaeus, 2000; 
McGuire & White, 1999) vary from personnel injuries to environmental pollution and loss of 
material assets. These consequences are imprecise in nature, each with its own measurement 
scale, and cannot be added mathematically. They may however be defined linguistically or 
on a qualitative scale. In this section, a new approach for the risk assessment of LNG carriers 
using a fuzzy inference system FIS is adopted. The main advantage of the use of the fuzzy 
inference system is its ability to handle imprecise data. The approach uses the concept of a 
pure fuzzy logic system. A fuzzy rule base is constructed to follow the logic used by the risk 
assessor when using the traditional qualitative risk matrix approach. The fuzzy inference 
engine uses these rules to determine a mapping from probability and consequences, 
modeled as fuzzy sets, to a fuzzy output set of risk values. In doing so, it is implied that 
probabilities/consequences used in the risk assessment process have an inherent degree of 
uncertainty. 
 
4.2 Fuzzy inference System 
Fuzzy inference is the process of mapping from a given input set to an output set using 
fuzzy logic. Membership functions, fuzzy logic operators and if-then rules are used in this 
process. The fuzzy inference system FIS is known in the literature by a number of names, 
such as fuzzy-rule-based system, fuzzy expert system or simply a fuzzy system (Kandel, 
1992). The basic advantage of such system is its tolerability to linguistic/imprecise data. In 
this work, the Mamdani and the Sugeno fuzzy inference methods are adopted (Mathworks, 
Inc., 2006). In the Mamdani type of inference, the output membership functions are fuzzy 
sets. These are in turn defuzzified to obtain a crisp output risk value for each consequence 
alternative. 
In the Sugeno method of fuzzy inference, output membership functions are either linear or 
constant. A typical rule in a Sugeno fuzzy model has the form: 
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Where a, b and c are the consequence parameters of the rule. The output level zi of each rule 
is weighted by the firing strength wi of the rule. For example, for an AND rule with Input 1 
= x and Input 2 = y, the firing strength is 
 
                        �� � ���������������������                     (4)  
where F1,2 (.) are the membership functions for inputs 1 and 2. 
The final output of the system is the weighted average of all rule outputs, computed as 
 
                                                          ������ ����� � ∑ ��������∑ ������                                                         (5)  
where N is the number of rules.  
Fig 2 shows the structure of the Mamdani fuzzy inference system FIS used for the 
assessment of a risk value for each consequence class or attribute. 
 
 Fig. 2. Fuzzy inference system for the assessment of risk values 
 
Fig. 3 shows a Sugeno FIS including two input variables x, y, and one output variable z. 
 
 Fig. 3. Fuzzy inference process – Sugeno s method 
 
 
5. Case Study: Assessment of LNG Risks during  
Loading/offloading at Terminals 
A case study is used to demonstrate the above mentioned  approaches for an LNG carrier 
loading at the terminal. Six hazardous scenarios are evaluated during LNG loading/offloading 
at the terminal (Elsayed, 2009 ). These are summarized in Table 4. As seen from Table 4, each 
consequence is denoted by a letter followed by a number. The letters (C,P,E,S,D,R,M) 
correspond to the consequence class for e.g. (crew, 3rd party personnel, environment, ship, 
downtime, reputation and 3rd party material assets). The numbers (1, 2, 3, and 4) correspond to 
the degree of severity of the consequence, for e.g. ‘minor’, ‘major’, ‘critical’ and ‘catastrophic’) 
on a qualitative scale.  
 
Haz id Hazard Description Likelihood Consequences 
1 Leak on the cargo system: unignited release – 
continuos flow. This comprises all leak sizes that 
cannot easily be stopped by operatioal routines to 
a rupture in apipe. Potential consequences is 
brittle fracture of hull or secondary structure. 
Frost burns for personnel. No consequences to 3rd 
party anticipated. 
Occasional 
(C) 
C2, P1, E1, S2, 
D3, R3, M1 
2 Release of liquid nitrogen: can give local effects 
to steel due to low temperature. Possible frost 
burn for personnel. 
Occasional 
(C) 
C2, P1, E1, S2, 
D2, R1, M1 
3 Release of bunker oil during loading operation. 
Very low risk of fire and personnel injuries. The oil 
may mess up nearby quays affecting 3rd party assets. 
Occasional 
(C) 
C1, P1, E3, S1, 
D2, R3, M2 
4 Fire in the engine room. Since always manned 
during this operational mode, the escalation 
potential is considered low. The event is considered 
not to affect 3rd party. All fires will have to be 
reported terminal, thus local reputation is affected. 
Remote 
(D) 
C3, P1, E1, S2, 
D3, R3, M1 
5 Accomodation fires. The crew present in the 
accomodation most likely quickly extinguishes 
these fires. It is considered to be less likely to 
occur than fire in the engine room, but still a 
remote probability. If developing to a large fire 
more crew members may be affected by the 
accident, than for an engine room fire. 3rd party 
not likely to be affected. 
Remote 
(D) 
C3, P1, E1, S2, 
D3, R3, M1 
6 Fires on open deck. Ignited cargo release. The 
consequences depend on the release size and the 
development of the event, including shutdown. 
Early ignition gives smaller consequences than late 
ignition. Most likely there is a flash fire which burn 
back to a smaller fire at the release location (jet or 
diffusive, depending on pressure in the system and 
if the release hits obstructions or not). Wether the 
fire may escalate to the LNG tanks depend on the 
possibility to shut down fuel to the fire. 
Remote 
(D) 
C4, P3, E1, S3, 
D4, R3, M2 
Table 4. Hazards considered during LNG loading/offloading at terminal 
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brittle fracture of hull or secondary structure. 
Frost burns for personnel. No consequences to 3rd 
party anticipated. 
Occasional 
(C) 
C2, P1, E1, S2, 
D3, R3, M1 
2 Release of liquid nitrogen: can give local effects 
to steel due to low temperature. Possible frost 
burn for personnel. 
Occasional 
(C) 
C2, P1, E1, S2, 
D2, R1, M1 
3 Release of bunker oil during loading operation. 
Very low risk of fire and personnel injuries. The oil 
may mess up nearby quays affecting 3rd party assets. 
Occasional 
(C) 
C1, P1, E3, S1, 
D2, R3, M2 
4 Fire in the engine room. Since always manned 
during this operational mode, the escalation 
potential is considered low. The event is considered 
not to affect 3rd party. All fires will have to be 
reported terminal, thus local reputation is affected. 
Remote 
(D) 
C3, P1, E1, S2, 
D3, R3, M1 
5 Accomodation fires. The crew present in the 
accomodation most likely quickly extinguishes 
these fires. It is considered to be less likely to 
occur than fire in the engine room, but still a 
remote probability. If developing to a large fire 
more crew members may be affected by the 
accident, than for an engine room fire. 3rd party 
not likely to be affected. 
Remote 
(D) 
C3, P1, E1, S2, 
D3, R3, M1 
6 Fires on open deck. Ignited cargo release. The 
consequences depend on the release size and the 
development of the event, including shutdown. 
Early ignition gives smaller consequences than late 
ignition. Most likely there is a flash fire which burn 
back to a smaller fire at the release location (jet or 
diffusive, depending on pressure in the system and 
if the release hits obstructions or not). Wether the 
fire may escalate to the LNG tanks depend on the 
possibility to shut down fuel to the fire. 
Remote 
(D) 
C4, P3, E1, S3, 
D4, R3, M2 
Table 4. Hazards considered during LNG loading/offloading at terminal 
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5.1 Qualitative Risk Assessment Results 
Table 5 provides a summary of the calculated qualitative risk values for the six hazardous 
scenarios and seven consequence attributes. As can be as seen the various consequence 
attributes are assigned linguistic risk values (low, medium, high) using the qualitative risk 
matrix outlined above. These consequences are then combined to provide an overall 
linguistic risk value for each accident scenario. 
 
 Leak on 
the 
cargo 
system 
Release 
of liquid 
nitrogen 
Release 
of 
bunker 
oil 
Fire in 
engine 
room 
Accommodation 
Fires 
Fires on 
open deck 
Crew Medium Medium Low Medium Medium Medium 
3rd party 
personnel 
Low Low Low Low Low Medium 
Environment Low Low Medium Low Low Low 
Ship Medium Medium Low Low Low Medium 
Downtime Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Reputation Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium 
3rd party 
material assets 
Low Low Medium Low Low Low 
Final rating Medium Low Medium Low Low Medium 
Table 5. Summary of calculated qualitative risk values for six hazardous scenarios and seven 
consequence attributes. 
 
5.2 Multiple Attribute Utility Risk Assessment Results 
A software tool has been written using a decision analysis software suite (Treeage, 2006) to 
implement the abovementioned risk model. Fig. 4 shows the risk model used for modeling 
of the LNG carrier loading/offloading at the terminal. Emanating from the hazard node are 
the six accident scenarios. These are ‘leak on the cargo system’, ‘release of liquid nitrogen’, 
‘release of bunker oil’, ‘fire in the engine room', ‘accommodation fires’ and ‘fires on open 
deck’. Each hazard is associated with a probability level. An overall consequence for each 
scenario is measured by seven consequences (crew, third-party personnel, environment, 
ship, down time, reputation and third-party material assets). Each consequence is modeled 
using a utility function. Formulated in this way, the optimum or minimum risk alternative 
corresponds to the highest maximum expected utility (MEU). The decision analysis software 
DATA (Decision Analysis by Treeage) was used for the modeling of the risk model. 
Sensitivity of hazardous scenarios to various model variables can also be carried out. Fig. 5 
shows the output of the risk model for the six hazardous scenarios. The risk model shows 
the most severe scenario, ‘Fire on Open Deck’, in this case corresponding to minimum total 
expected utility (MTEU) value of 0.00406. The program windows interface shows a red 
color, which indicates the most severe scenario. 
Fig. 6 shows a snapshot of a one-way sensitivity analysis with respect to ‘occasional 
probability’. As can be seen the recommendations of the risk model are not affected by the 
change in the probability level within the range considered (0.005–0.05) 
 
 Fig. 4. Basic framework for risk model for LNG loading/offloading at terminal using 
multiple attribute utility theory 
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 Fig. 5. Risk model showing most severe scenario 'fires on open deck', corresponding to 
minimum total expected utility  
 
 Fig. 6. Sensitivity analysis on 'occasional probability'. 
 
5.3 Fuzzy Risk Assessment Results 
 
5.3.1 Determination of Membership Functions and Rule Base 
In order to adopt this approach for risk assessment, probabilities of accident scenarios as 
well as accident consequences are modeled as fuzzy sets. In doing so, it is implied that 
probabilities/consequences are by themselves uncertain or at least a degree of uncertainty is 
associated with their values. Several approaches for building and adapting membership 
functions exist (Zhou et al., 1997). In this work, a fixed center-based membership function 
approach using the symmetric Gaussian membership function was adopted. One 
membership function is assigned to each value of the fuzzy variable. The Gaussian 
membership function depends on two parameters and is given by: 
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Rule 8:    if (Probability is Probable) and (Consequence is Catastrophic) then Risk is High. 
Rule 9:    if (Probability is Occasional) and (Consequence is Minor) then Risk is Low. 
Rule 10:  if (Probability is Occasional) and (Consequence is Major) then Risk is Medium. 
Rule 11:  if (Probability is Occasional) and (Consequence is Critical) then Risk is Medium 
Rule 12:  if (Probability is Occasional) and (Consequence is Catastrophic) then Risk is High. 
 
As can be seen, the first four rules represent the first row in the qualitative risk matrix given 
in Table 3. The second row in the matrix is represented by the next four rules i.e. rules 5-8 
and so on. For the qualitative risk matrix given in Table 3, (Skramstad & Musaeus, 2000), the 
numbers of rows is five and the number of columns is four, i.e. a total of twenty rules are 
needed for modeling the logic embedded in this matrix. As such, the total number of rules 
needed to construct the fuzzy inference engine can be expressed as: 
 
                                                          � � ����                                                   (7) 
 
where N = number of fuzzy if-then rules 
            m = number of rows in qualitative risk matrix. 
            n  = number of columns in qualitative risk matrix.  
                        
These rules provide the mapping for each hazardous scenario for only one consequence 
attribute.  
 
5.3.2 Application to Hazardous Scenarios 
Often LNG risk assessment problems involve multiple consequence attributes for each 
hazardous scenario, such as material assets, human life and/or environmental pollution. 
These consequences are combined to provide an overall risk value for each accident 
scenario. In this work, a fuzzy risk index FRI is used to combine the various consequence 
attribute risks into a unified risk measure. The fuzzy risk index FRI value is an average 
aggregation operator for each accident scenario can be calculated by (Yager, 1988) 
 
                                                      ��� � �∑ ���������������∑ ������                                                         (8)  
where  N      = number of consequences. 
              ki      = weight factor for each consequence. 
             Riski = calculated fuzzy risk value for each consequence attribute.  
 
The weighting factors ki reflects the attribute's relative importance. Fig. 9 shows the 
structural hierarchy and information storage for the fuzzy inference system used. The FIS 
structure contains various substructures which in turn contain variable names, membership 
function definitions and computation method. 
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Rule 8:    if (Probability is Probable) and (Consequence is Catastrophic) then Risk is High. 
Rule 9:    if (Probability is Occasional) and (Consequence is Minor) then Risk is Low. 
Rule 10:  if (Probability is Occasional) and (Consequence is Major) then Risk is Medium. 
Rule 11:  if (Probability is Occasional) and (Consequence is Critical) then Risk is Medium 
Rule 12:  if (Probability is Occasional) and (Consequence is Catastrophic) then Risk is High. 
 
As can be seen, the first four rules represent the first row in the qualitative risk matrix given 
in Table 3. The second row in the matrix is represented by the next four rules i.e. rules 5-8 
and so on. For the qualitative risk matrix given in Table 3, (Skramstad & Musaeus, 2000), the 
numbers of rows is five and the number of columns is four, i.e. a total of twenty rules are 
needed for modeling the logic embedded in this matrix. As such, the total number of rules 
needed to construct the fuzzy inference engine can be expressed as: 
 
                                                          � � ����                                                   (7) 
 
where N = number of fuzzy if-then rules 
            m = number of rows in qualitative risk matrix. 
            n  = number of columns in qualitative risk matrix.  
                        
These rules provide the mapping for each hazardous scenario for only one consequence 
attribute.  
 
5.3.2 Application to Hazardous Scenarios 
Often LNG risk assessment problems involve multiple consequence attributes for each 
hazardous scenario, such as material assets, human life and/or environmental pollution. 
These consequences are combined to provide an overall risk value for each accident 
scenario. In this work, a fuzzy risk index FRI is used to combine the various consequence 
attribute risks into a unified risk measure. The fuzzy risk index FRI value is an average 
aggregation operator for each accident scenario can be calculated by (Yager, 1988) 
 
                                                      ��� � �∑ ���������������∑ ������                                                         (8)  
where  N      = number of consequences. 
              ki      = weight factor for each consequence. 
             Riski = calculated fuzzy risk value for each consequence attribute.  
 
The weighting factors ki reflects the attribute's relative importance. Fig. 9 shows the 
structural hierarchy and information storage for the fuzzy inference system used. The FIS 
structure contains various substructures which in turn contain variable names, membership 
function definitions and computation method. 
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Fig. 11. Output risk surface envelope (Sugeno) for two fuzzy inputs: probability and 
consequence 
 
Table 7 provides a summary of the calculated fuzzy risk values for the six scenarios and 
seven consequence attributes. Both the Mamdani/Sugeno methods of inference were used 
in the calculation of final risk output values. Table 8 shows a comparison between 
qualitative and fuzzy risk assessment results for the six scenarios considered. Figures 12 and 
13 show the Sugeno fuzzy risk values for material assets and crew respectively. Figures 14 
and 15 show the Mamdani fuzzy risk values for material assets and crew respectively.  
 
 Leak on the 
cargo 
system 
Release of 
liquid 
nitrogen 
Release of 
bunker oil 
Fire in 
engine room 
Accommoda
tion Fires 
Fires on 
open deck 
 M S M S M S M S M S M S 
Crew 5.50 5.30 5.50 5.30 4.35 2.51 5.76 6.06 5.76 6.06 6.31 7.83 
3rd party 
personnel 
4.35 2.51 4.35 2.51 4.35 2.51 4.23 1.80 4.23 1.80 5.76 6.06 
Environment 4.35 2.51 4.35 2.51 5.84 6.92 4.23 1.80 4.23 1.80 4.23 1.80 
Ship 5.50 5.30 5.50 5.30 4.35 2.51 4.67 3.56 4.67 3.56 5.76 6.06 
Downtime 5.84 6.92 5.50 5.30 5.50 5.30 5.76 6.06 5.76 6.06 6.31 7.83 
Reputation 5.84 6.92 4.35 2.51 5.84 6.92 5.76 6.06 5.76 6.06 5.76 6.06 
3rd party 
material 
assets 
4.35 2.51 4.35 2.51 5.50 5.30 4.23 1.80 4.23 1.80 4.67 3.56 
Final rating 5.10 4.57 4.83 3.70 5.10 4.57 4.95 3.88 4.95 3.88 5.54 5.60 
 
Table 7. Summary of calculated fuzzy risk values for six hazardous scenarios and seven 
consequence attributes. (M=Mamdani method, S=Sugeno method). 
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Table 7 provides a summary of the calculated fuzzy risk values for the six scenarios and 
seven consequence attributes. Both the Mamdani/Sugeno methods of inference were used 
in the calculation of final risk output values. Table 8 shows a comparison between 
qualitative and fuzzy risk assessment results for the six scenarios considered. Figures 12 and 
13 show the Sugeno fuzzy risk values for material assets and crew respectively. Figures 14 
and 15 show the Mamdani fuzzy risk values for material assets and crew respectively.  
 
 Leak on the 
cargo 
system 
Release of 
liquid 
nitrogen 
Release of 
bunker oil 
Fire in 
engine room 
Accommoda
tion Fires 
Fires on 
open deck 
 M S M S M S M S M S M S 
Crew 5.50 5.30 5.50 5.30 4.35 2.51 5.76 6.06 5.76 6.06 6.31 7.83 
3rd party 
personnel 
4.35 2.51 4.35 2.51 4.35 2.51 4.23 1.80 4.23 1.80 5.76 6.06 
Environment 4.35 2.51 4.35 2.51 5.84 6.92 4.23 1.80 4.23 1.80 4.23 1.80 
Ship 5.50 5.30 5.50 5.30 4.35 2.51 4.67 3.56 4.67 3.56 5.76 6.06 
Downtime 5.84 6.92 5.50 5.30 5.50 5.30 5.76 6.06 5.76 6.06 6.31 7.83 
Reputation 5.84 6.92 4.35 2.51 5.84 6.92 5.76 6.06 5.76 6.06 5.76 6.06 
3rd party 
material 
assets 
4.35 2.51 4.35 2.51 5.50 5.30 4.23 1.80 4.23 1.80 4.67 3.56 
Final rating 5.10 4.57 4.83 3.70 5.10 4.57 4.95 3.88 4.95 3.88 5.54 5.60 
 
Table 7. Summary of calculated fuzzy risk values for six hazardous scenarios and seven 
consequence attributes. (M=Mamdani method, S=Sugeno method). 
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Id 
 
               Hazard   
  
 
 
Qualitative risk value 
Mamdani 
fuzzy  risk  
value 
Sugeno 
fuzzy  risk  
value 
1 Leak on the cargo system Medium 5.1073 4.5706 
2 Release of liquid nitrogen Low 4.8437 3.7091 
3 Release of bunker oil Medium 5.1073 4.5706 
4 Fire in engine room Low 4.9524 3.8820 
5 Accommodation fires Low 4.9524 3.8820 
6 Fires on open deck Medium 5.5461 5.6054 
 
Table 8. Comparison between qualitative and fuzzy risk values for six hazardous scenarios.  
 
  
Fig. 12. Sugeno fuzzy risk values for material assets 
 
  
Fig. 13. Sugeno fuzzy risk values for personnel 
 
 
 Fig. 14. Mamdani fuzzy risk values for material assets 
 
  Fig. 15. Mamdani fuzzy risk values for personnel 
 
As can be seen in Table 4, scenarios 1 and 3 are expected to have equal risk values. Both 
scenarios have a probability level of 'occasional' and the same combined overall 
consequence level of (3 ‘minor’, 2 ‘major’ and 2 ‘critical’). As can be seen in Table 7, the 
computed fuzzy risk values for these two scenarios  are indeed equal. Same situation applies 
to scenarios 4 and 5. Their corresponding computed fuzzy risk values provided in 
Table 7 are also equal. Table 9 provides a comparison between risk results for crew obtained 
using a qualitative risk matrix approach (Skramstad & Musaeus, 2000) and those using a 
fuzzy risk index measure. Scenarios are ranked from least severe to most severe with respect 
to risks to crew members. As can be seen, the same ranking is obtained using both methods 
for the six hazardous scenarios under consideration.  
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Qualitative 
risk values 
Mamdani 
fuzzy  risk 
value 
Sugeno 
fuzzy  risk 
value 
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Leak on the cargo system Medium 5.50 5.30 
Release of liquid nitrogen Medium 5.50 5.30 
Fire in engine room Medium 5.76 6.06 
Accommodation fires Medium 5.76 6.06 
Fires on open deck Medium 6.31 7.83 
 
Table 9. Comparison between fuzzy risk results and qualitative risk values for crew 
 
6. Conclusion 
Various methodologies for the risk assessment of LNG transfer operations at the ship-shore 
interface of gas terminals were presented. These include a qualitative risk matrix approach, 
a multiple attribute utility model and a fuzzy inference system. The use of multiple attribute 
utility theory in risk assessment of LNG operations allows the ranking of risk alternatives 
based on a unified utility measure. A maximum risk alternative is selected to minimize the 
overall expected utility. This methodology allows modeling of the decision maker’s attitude 
towards risk, i.e., risk aversion/neutral and/or risk taker. Available software tools allow 
ranking of risk alternatives and sensitivity analyses to be carried out to assess the 
sensitivities of the risk model’s recommendations to various modeling variables.  
An approach for the assessment of multiple attribute risk using fuzzy set theory was also 
presented. The developed methodology is an alternative to qualitative risk assessment 
matrices currently used in many industries and by ship classification societies. A three 
dimensional risk envelope or surface is generated and used for computation of risk values 
as replacement to the traditional risk matrix.The use of fuzzy sets and a fuzzy inference 
engine is suited for handling imprecision often associated with accident likelihood and 
consequence data. The total number of rules needed to construct the fuzzy inference engine 
is the product of the number of rows and the number of columns for the corresponding 
qualitative risk matrix. The proposed approach improves upon existing qualitative methods 
and allows the ranking of risk alternatives based on a unified measure. A fuzzy risk index 
was adopted for aggregation of multiple consequences into a unified measure. Both the 
Mamdani and Sugeno type inference methods were adopted. Results show that while the 
Mamdani method is intuitive and well suited to human input, the Sugeno method is  
computationally more efficient and guarantees continuity of the final risk output surface. It 
was also found that computed risk results using a fuzzy risk index measure are consistent 
with those obtained using a qualitative risk matrix approach. The use of a fuzzy inferene 
system provides  more output information than the traditional risk matrix approach. Such 
approach is applicable to other ship operating modes such as transit in open sea and/or 
entering/leaving port 
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